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The Contribution of Thomas Carlyle to British Idealism, c. 1880 – 1930  
 
 That Thomas Carlyle (1795 – 1881) exercised an enormous influence over the 
British Idealism of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries has often been 
noted. Through works such as Sartor Resartus (1833–4), Heroes and Hero-Worship 
(1841), Past and Present (1843) and Latter-Day Pamphlets (1850), it has been pointed 
out, Carlyle transmitted his beliefs regarding the immanence of the divine in nature and 
man, the inadequacy of utilitarianism and laissez-faire and the ethical role of the state to 
a generation of subsequent philosophers. However, while scholars have certainly 
acknowledged Carlyle’s influence on British Idealism, they have done so passingly, 
superficially, and on the basis of only a tiny fraction of the relevant source material.1 
                                                          
1 Some recent representative statements are W. J. Mander, ‘Introduction’, in W. J. Mander (ed.), Anglo-
American Idealism, 1865-1927 (Westport, CN, 2000), 1-19, at 2-3; David Boucher, ‘Introduction’, in 
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 In contrast, the current article will provide a close, comprehensive and even 
exhaustive analysis of the British Idealists’ debts to Carlyle. In terms of temporal scope, 
the article will focus primarily on sources published between 1880 and 1930. No doubt, 
long before 1880, contemporaries were already referring to Carlyle as ‘first and 
foremost among the idealistic writers of our age’, and the leader of a nascent school of 
‘English Idealism’.2 Moreover, during the later years of his life, Carlyle also served as 
an enthusiastic patron to James Hutchison Stirling, the author of The Secret of Hegel 
(1865), a book widely recognised as a watershed in the history of British Idealism.3 
                                                                                                                                                                          
David Boucher (ed.), The Scottish Idealists (Exeter, 2004), 1-22, at 2-3; John Morrow, Thomas 
Carlyle (London, 2006), 217-18; Cairns Craig, ‘Nineteenth-Century Scottish Thought’, in Ian Brown, 
Thomas Clancy, Susan Manning and Murray Pittock (eds.), Edinburgh History of Scottish Literature, 
3 vols (Edinburgh, 2006), ii, 267-76; W. J. Mander, British Idealism: A History (Oxford, 2011), 25-7; 
David Fergusson, ‘Scottish Idealism’, in Karl Ameriks (ed.), The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of 
Post-Kantian German Thought, vol. I, ‘Philosophy and Natural Sciences’ (Cambridge, 2013), 272-98, 
at 276-7; David Boucher, ‘The Scottish Contribution to British Idealism and the Reception of Hegel’, 
in Gordon Graham (ed.), Scottish Philosophy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Oxford, 
2015), 154-82, at 158-9. In what follows, my aim is not to dispute the claims of these scholars, but 
rather to develop and substantiate them. For this reason (and for reasons of space), I will make 
relatively little reference to the secondary literature, preferring instead a sustained and extensive 
engagement with the primary sources. 
2 J. D. Morell, A Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth 
Century, 2 vols (London, 1846), ii, 201, 207, see also 483-5; H. Taine, L’Idéalisme anglaise: Etude 
sur Carlyle (Paris, 1864), 3, 127. Cf. [James Fitzjames Stephen], ‘A French View of Mr Carlyle’, 
Saturday Review, 17 (1864), 690-91, at 690.  
3 J. H. Stirling (1820-1909), Scottish-born physician and independent scholar. When Stirling applied for 
the Chairs of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow and Edinburgh in 1866 and 1868 respectively, Carlyle 
provided testimonials, describing Stirling as the ‘one man in Britain capable of bringing metaphysical 
philosophy, in the ultimate, German or European, and highest actual form of it, distinctly home to the 
understanding of British men’. See Amelia Hutchison Stirling, James Hutchison Stirling: His Life and 
Work (London, 1912), 49-59, 94-6, 111-13, 172-6, 184, 200-202, quotation from 1868 testimonial at 
206-7. See also TC to Emerson, 28 Sep 1870, The Correspondence of Emerson and Carlyle, ed. J. 
Slater (New York, 1964), 573. On Stirling’s book as a watershed in the history of British Idealism, see 
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However, the half-century between 1880 and 1930 was the peak period of British 
Idealism, and this is when the largest number and most significant references to Carlyle 
occurred. 
 In terms of geographical scope, the current article will concentrate primarily on 
British Idealism as practised within Britain itself. In particular, it will focus heavily 
upon the so-called ‘Scottish Idealists’, many of whom were trained by Edward Caird 
during his tenure of the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow (1866–93), before being 
dispatched to universities throughout Britain.4 However, the article will also 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Mander, British Idealism, 9. 
4 On ‘Scottish Idealism’, see note 1 above. Edward Caird (1835-1908) was Professor of Moral Philosophy 
at Glasgow 1866-93, then Master of Balliol College, Oxford 1893-1907. The pupils of Caird at 
Glasgow taken into account are: Henry Jones (1852-1922), lecturer at Aberystwyth, Bangor and St. 
Andrews 1882-94, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow 1894-1922; John Stuart Mackenzie 
(1860-1935), Fellow at Edinburgh 1884-9, Fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge 1890-96, Professor 
of Logic and Philosophy at University College, Cardiff 1895-1915; John Henry Muirhead (1855-
1940), Snell Exhibitioner at Balliol 1875-9, lecturer at Glasgow and Royal Holloway College, 
Professor of Philosophy and Public Economy at University of Birmingham 1896-1921; John 
MacCunn (1846-1929), Snell Exhibitioner at Balliol 1872-9, Professor of Philosophy at University 
College, Liverpool 1881-1911. Also taken into account is Hector Hetherington (1888-1965), a pupil of 
Caird’s successor at Glasgow, Henry Jones, lecturer in philosophy at Glasgow 1910-14, Professor of 
Logic and Philosophy at University College, Cardiff 1915-20, Professor of Philosophy at University 
College, Exeter 1920-24, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, 1924-7, Vice-Chancellor at 
Liverpool 1927-36, Principal and Vice-Chancellor at Glasgow 1936-61. However, several alumni of 
Edinburgh will also be taken into account, namely: David George Ritchie (1853-1903), classical 
exhibitioner, fellow and tutor at Balliol College and Jesus College, Oxford 1875-94, Professor of 
Logic and Metaphysics at St. Andrews 1894-1903; Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison) (1856-1931), 
Professor of Logic and Philosophy at University College, Cardiff 1883-7, Professor of Logic, Rhetoric 
and Metaphysics at St Andrews 1887–91, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh 1891-
1919; James Seth (1860-1925), Professor of Metaphysics at Dalhousie College, Canada 1886-92, 
Professor at Brown University, USA 1892-6, Professor at Cornell University, USA, 1896-8, Professor 
of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh 1898-1925; William Ritchie Sorley (1855-1935), Professor at 
University College, Cardiff 1888-94, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen 1894-1900, 
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demonstrate that indigenous English Idealists, based for the most part at Balliol College, 
Oxford (to which Caird himself moved in 1893), owed similar debts to Carlyle.5 
Moreover, as one of Caird’s students pointed out, the master’s ‘intellectual children’ 
also guarded ‘the outposts of the Empire’, and some attention will be given to those 
British Idealists employed at universities in Canada, Australia and South Africa (and, in 
one exceptional case, the USA).6 In this way, the writings of a total of twenty-eight 
British Idealist philosophers will be taken into account. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge 1900-33; James Black Baillie (1872-1940), 
Professor of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen 1902-24, Vice-Chancellor at Leeds 1924-38. Another 
Edinburgh alumnus taken into account is Richard Burdon Haldane (1856-1928), Liberal MP 1885-
1911, Secretary of State for War 1905-12, Lord Chancellor 1912-15 and 1924. 
5 The Balliol men taken into account are: Richard Lewis Nettleship (1846-92), Fellow and Tutor at Balliol 
1869-92; Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), lecturer at University College, Oxford 1871-81, employee 
of London Ethical Society and Charity Organisation Society 1881-97, Professor of Moral Philosophy 
at St. Andrews 1903-8; Andrew Cecil Bradley (1851-1935), Fellow at Balliol 1874-81, Professor of 
Literature and History at University College, Liverpool 1882-9, Regius Professor at Glasgow 1889-
1901, Professor of Poetry at Oxford 1901-6; John Alexander Smith (1863-1939), Jowett Lecturer of 
Philosophy at Balliol 1896-1910, Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy 1910-
36. Beyond Balliol, other Oxford scholars taken into account are: Henry Nettleship (1839-93), Corpus 
Professor of Latin 1878-93; Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924), Fellow at Merton College 1870-
1924; Clement Charles Julius Webb (1865-1954), Fellow and Tutor at Magdalen College 1889-1922, 
Oriel Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion 1920-30. As noted in note 4 above, 
Muirhead, MacCunn and Ritchie all spent time at Balliol.  
6 R. M. Wenley, ‘Edward Caird’, Harvard Theological Review, vol. 2, no. 2 (1909), 115-38, at 122. Pupils 
of Caird at Glasgow taken into account are: John Watson (1847-1939), Professor of Logic, 
Metaphysics and Ethics at Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada 1872-89, Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at the same 1889-1924; James Cappon (1854-1939), lecturer at Glasgow, Professor of 
English Language and Literature at Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada 1888-1919; Robert Mark 
Wenley (1861-1929), lecturer at Glasgow 1886-96, Professor of Philosophy at University of 
Michigan, USA 1896-1929. Other alumni of Glasgow taken into account are John Clark Murray 
(1836-1917), a classmate of Caird at Glasgow, who became Professor of Moral and Mental 
Philosophy at Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada 1862-72, and Professor of Logic at McGill 
University, Montreal, Canada 1872-1903, and Hugh Adam Reyburn (1886-1950), a pupil of Henry 
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 What is immediately apparent is that many of these thinkers made extremely 
strong statements regarding the enormous importance of Carlyle, and particularly his 
role in preparing the ground for the reception of German Idealism in Britain. As early as 
1850, J. H. Stirling wrote of how Carlyle had transformed ‘the whole field of 
intellectual vision’, later recalling that he had been ‘every literary young man’s idol, 
almost the god he prayed to’.7 In 1868 R. L. Nettleship expressed his belief that Carlyle 
‘ought to be published in volumes “for the waistcoat pocket,” that one might drink of 
him whenever one felt faint’, while in 1887 Bernard Bosanquet opined that ‘Carlyle’s 
work has had an influence on English life that cannot be calculated’, ‘the whole 
movement of our time’ having ‘received a large part of its stimulus from him’.8 For his 
part, Edward Caird recalled in 1892 that during his youth, ‘Carlyle was the author who 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Jones at Glasgow, who became Professor of Logic and Psychology at the University of Cape Town, 
South Africa 1912-50. Also taken into account are two alumni of Edinburgh, namely Henry Laurie 
(1837-1922), Lecturer in Logic at the University of Melbourne, Australia 1882-6, Professor of Mental 
and Moral Philosophy at the same 1886-1911, and James Seth, who taught at Dalhousie College in 
Canada from 1886 to 1892 (see note 4 above). Also taken into account is one alumnus of Balliol, 
namely Arthur Ritchie Lord (1880-1941), lecturer in political science at Aberdeen 1902-5, Professor 
of Philosophy and History at Rhodes University College, Grahamstown, South Africa 1905-40, and 
one alumnus of Cambridge, namely William Jethro Brown (1868-1930), Professor of Law and 
Modern History at the University of Tasmania, Australia 1893-1900, Professor of Constitutional Law 
at University College London 1901-2, Professor of Comparative Law at University College Wales, 
Aberystwyth 1902-6, Professor of Law at the University of Adelaide, Australia 1906-16. 
7 [J. H. Stirling], ‘Letters on Carlyle’, The Truth-Seeker or Present Age (London, 1850), 94-101, 148-63, 
245-9, at 97; James Hutchison Stirling, Thomas Carlyle’s Counsels to a Literary Aspirant (Edinburgh, 
1886), 27. 
8 R. L. Nettleship to H. S. Holland, 4 Sep. 1868, in Henry Scott Holland: Memoirs and Letters, ed. 
Stephen Paget (London, 1921), 28; Bernard Bosanquet, letter dated 24 Dec. 1887, in Helen 
Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet: A Short Account of His Life (London, 1924), 41. See also Bernard 
Bosanquet, ‘The Philosophical Importance of a True Theory of Identity,’ Mind, 13 (1888), 356-69, at 
369. 
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exercised the most powerful charm upon young men who were beginning to think’, 
having been the first to discover not only ‘the full significance of the great revival of 
German literature’, but also what it ‘meant for us’.9 In 1908 J. S. Mackenzie also 
identified Carlyle as a crucial figure in the introduction of German Idealism into Britain, 
while in 1909 Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison recalled the enormous influence of Carlyle 
during his own undergraduate days, describing him as ‘the greatest living Scotsman and 
one of the chief intellectual and moral forces of the century’.10 Over subsequent years, 
Henry Jones, R. M. Wenley, C. C. J. Webb, J. S. Mackenzie and James Cappon all 
acknowledged Carlyle as a key figure in the dissemination of German Idealism in 
Britain, while in 1920 W. R. Sorley praised Carlyle for having ‘forced upon public 
attention ideas concerning the ultimate meaning and value of life’.11 In 1922 Henry 
Jones described Carlyle ‘one of the greatest spiritual forces in this country in the 
nineteenth century’,12 while in 1929 A. C. Bradley recalled that the writings of Carlyle 
                                                          
9 Edward Caird, ‘The Genius of Carlyle’, in idem., Essays on Literature and Philosophy, 2 vols (Glasgow, 
1892), i, 230-67, at 233. 
10 J. S. Mackenzie, ‘La philosophie contemporaine en Grande-Bretagne’, Revue de métaphysique et de 
morale, 16 (1908), 583-606, at 583-6, 600; A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, ‘Introduction’, Selected Essays of 
Thomas Carlyle (London, 1909), vii-xix, at viii. 
11 Henry Jones, The Working Faith of the Social Reformer and Other Essays (London, 1910), 197-8; R. 
M. Wenley, Kant and his Philosophical Revolution (New York, 1910), 271; Clement C. J. Webb, A 
History of Philosophy (New York and London, 1915), 236-7; J. S. Mackenzie, ‘The Ethical Theory of 
Hegel: A Study of the Philosophy of Right. By Hugh A. Reyburn’, Mind, new series, 31 (1922), 356-
8, at 357; James Cappon, ‘A School of Idealism: Meditatio Laici’, in Philosophical Essays Presented 
to John Watson (Kingston, Ontario, 1922), 1-36, at 1, 19; William Ritchie Sorley, A History of English 
Philosophy (Cambridge, 1920), 239-40. 
12 Henry Jones, A Faith that Enquires: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Glasgow in the 
Years 1920 and 1921 (London, 1922), 7. As Jones recalled, he had first discovered Carlyle while a 
student in Wales: ‘It was a case of love at first sight, and my young admiration has but deepened with 
the years’. See Henry Jones, Old Memories, ed. T. Jones (London, 1922), 95, also 68. 
7 
 
had ‘permeated’ the ‘minds of several generations’.13 Even as late as 1931 J. H. 
Muirhead wrote of how Carlyle had ‘exercised an influence in England and America 
that no other did upon the course of philosophical thought of his time’.14  
 To be sure, such glowing praise was at times qualified. Indeed, the British 
Idealists often acknowledged that Carlyle’s knowledge of German Idealism had been 
incomplete, particularly in his ignorance of Hegel, and that his writings had lacked 
philosophical rigor and systematicity. For this reason, they stressed the need for a 
detailed study of German Idealism, and particularly of Hegel, and presented their own 
endeavours as an attempt to complete the work that Carlyle had begun. For instance, in 
The Secret of Hegel (1865), J. H. Stirling acknowledged Carlyle’s leading role in the 
‘Germanico-Literary Re-action’ against ‘the Aufklärung’, while claiming that this had 
been ‘incomplete’ and ‘subjective’, a defect that could be remedied through recourse to 
Hegel.15 Similarly, in 1891 Henry Jones wrote of how Carlyle had only ‘brought us 
within sight of our future, and we are now taking a step into it’, while in 1901 R. M. 
Wenley lamented that Carlyle ‘had neither stayed to probe the roots of idealism in Kant, 
nor proceeded to think through the constructive expression in Hegel’.16 Three years later 
                                                          
13 A. C. Bradley, A Miscellany (London, 1929), 7-8. 
14 John H. Muirhead, ‘Carlyle’s Transcendental Symbolism’, in idem., The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-
Saxon Philosophy (London, 1931), pp. 123-46, at 127. See also John Henry Muirhead, Reflections by 
a Journeyman in Philosophy (London, 1942), 32. 
15 James Hutchison Stirling, The Secret of Hegel: Being the Hegelian System in Order, Principle, Form, 
and Matter, 2 vols (London, 1865), i, lxxiii-lxxiv. Following a visit to Carlyle’s home in 1857, Stirling 
had noted: ‘Kant, Spinoza, Hegel – knows little of those’. See Stirling, James Hutchison Stirling, 140-
41, and also James Hutchison Stirling, What is Thought? or the Problem of Philosophy (Edinburgh, 
1900), 212. 
16 Henry Jones, Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher (Glasgow, 1891), 72; R. M. Wenley, 
‘Some Lights on the British Idealistic Movement in the Nineteenth Century’, American Journal of 
Theology, 5 (1901), 445-72, at 457. 
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in 1904 a comparable point was made by R. B. Haldane, who remarked, with reference 
to Carlyle, that while ‘Art and Religion can do much’, ‘it is only the iron logic of 
philosophy’ that can reveal ‘the full truth’.17 For his part, J. H. Muirhead admitted in 
1912 that Carlyle had frequently expressed ‘contempt’ for ‘the systematizing spirit’, 
preferring to rely instead on ‘intuition’.18 Similarly, in their biography of Edward Caird, 
published in 1921, Jones and Muirhead wrote of how 
 
Carlyle had startled the minds of men rather than convinced them. He had flung 
explosives and flashlights into the darkness around, but there was no steady 
vision nor quiet possession of the new country… Carlyle employed the 
conceptions which were to rule the new era against the existing ways of life and 
forms of belief rather than evolved their significance constructively. 
 
According to Jones and Muirhead, ‘after the denunciatory prophet, there was [thus] 
room and need for the placid teacher and the steadying strength of demonstrated truth’, 
a role that had effectively been performed by Caird.19  
                                                          
17 R. B. Haldane, The Pathway to Reality: Stage the Second. Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered in the 
University of St Andrews in the Session 1903 – 1904 (London, 1904), 104-5. 
18 J. H. Muirhead, ‘Ethics’, in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings, 12 vols 
(Edinburgh, 1908–27), vol. 5 (1912), 414-25, at 416. 
19 Henry Jones and John Henry Muirhead, The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird (Glasgow, 1921), 
59-60. See also J. S. Mackenzie, ‘Conflicts in Valuations’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
new series, 31 (1930-31), 161-82, at 171, John Alexander Smith, ‘The Influence of Hegel on the 
Philosophy of Great Britain’, in B. Wigersma (ed.), Verhandlungen des ersten Hegelkongresses von 
22. bis 25. April 1930 in Haag (Tübingen, 1931), 57-66, 59, and J. H. Muirhead, ‘F. H. Bradley’, in 
Idealismus: Jahrbuch für die idealistische Philosophie, 1 (1934), 199-204, at 199. 
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 Nonetheless, as the current article will demonstrate, the British Idealists were 
enormously influenced by Carlyle in almost every aspect of their thought, including 
their theology, their moral and ethical philosophy and their social and political thought. 
Together, an analysis of these debts will contribute to our understanding of the 
transition that occurred within British philosophy from the late-eighteenth to the early-
twentieth centuries, very largely under the impetus of a specifically Scottish tradition of 
thought. Indeed, as Ralph Jessop has forcefully argued, the opposition of earlier Scottish 
thinkers such as Thomas Reid (1710–96) and William Hamilton (1788–1856) to the 
scepticism, materialism and sensationalism of David Hume (1711–76) was given 
powerful continuance in the works of Carlyle, being further reinforced through 
reference to contemporary German Idealism.20 As this article will make clear, Carlyle 
then in turn bequeathed this tradition to a band of subsequent Idealist philosophers, a 
very large proportion of whom were also Scots, who had received their early education 
within the Scottish university system, and who were similarly drawn to German 
Idealism. Thus, Carlyle emerges as far-and-away the most prominent figure in a 
tradition of Scottish philosophy that stretched across a period of three centuries, and 
which culminated in British Idealism, the hegemonic philosophical school in Britain for 
several decades. In this sense, as Edward Caird put it in 1883, Carlyle, like Hegel, was 
one of the crucial figures in the ‘great movement of thought which characterizes the 
nineteenth century’, namely ‘a movement through negation to reaffirmation, through 
destruction to reconstruction’.21 Furthermore, in political terms, such an excavation will 
                                                          
20 Ralph Jessop, Carlyle and Scottish Thought (Basingstoke, 1997). 
21 Edward Caird, Hegel [1883], American ed. (Philadelphia, PA, 1896), 2-3. See also James Cappon, 
Edward Caird, a Reminiscence (Kingston, Ontario, 1909), 279, where Cappon remarks: ‘he who 
cannot think in the forms of Hegel and Carlyle does not really participate in modern thought’. 
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serve to recover the immense legacy that Carlyle left between his death in 1881 and the 
1930s, after which his reputation was engulfed by accusations of ‘fascism’, having 
never recovered even to the present day.22 Indeed, as the sources surveyed below reveal, 
Carlyle’s influence during these earlier decades was in fact broadly progressive, 
consisting in socialistic proposals for economic reform, as well as projects for the 
education of the working classes for participation and citizenship within a representative 
democracy. Finally, a study of the British Idealists’ response to Carlyle will validate the 
conclusions of some recent research on Carlyle himself, while at the same time 
providing a stimulus to future inquiry.23 
 
Religion and Metaphysics 
 
With regard to theology, the British Idealists strongly endorsed Carlyle’s 
polemic against the mechanistic Deism of the eighteenth century, and particularly its 
conception of a transcendent God, who had designed the world in the manner of a 
machine, and then withdrew, sat back, and watched it run, and whose existence was to 
be demonstrated through ‘evidences’ of ‘design’. For instance, as Henry Jones wrote in 
1891, Carlyle had, ‘more than any other English writer’, testified to the ‘despair’ that 
                                                          
22 For a succinct and representative statement of such charges, see J. Salwyn Schapiro, ‘Thomas Carlyle: 
Prophet of Fascism’, The Journal of Modern History, 17 (1945), 97-115. For an overview and 
refutation of such accusations, see David R. Sorensen, ‘“The Great Pioneer of National Socialist 
Philosophy”? Carlyle and Twentieth-Century Totalitarianism’, Studies in the Literary Imagination, 45 
(2012), 43-66. 
23 The author wishes to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for having pushed him to the broader 
historiographical claims that are made in this paragraph. 
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naturally ‘followed’ from ‘the Deism of the eighteenth century’.24 Similarly, in 1897 
Andrew Seth remarked that ‘Carlyle’s running polemic against what he calls “the 
mechanical system of thought,” and the grim irony with which he assails the notion of 
“proof of a God,” – “a probable God,” – furnish some of his strongest passages’.25 In 
1901 R. M. Wenley noted that ‘when Carlyle began to exercise vital sway over the 
youth’, Britain was still dominated by the ‘natural theology’ of ‘Locke’, ‘Paley’ and the 
‘authors of the Bridgewater Treatises’. ‘Summarily stated’, Wenley explained, ‘this 
popular theory separate[d] God from the world and conceive[d] of him as interfering 
with the natural order in the same ways as an artificer might use his materials’. Such 
doctrines, Wenley claimed, had ‘remained unchallenged to all intents and purposes till 
Carlyle’s appearance’.26 Several years later, in 1909, Henry Jones once again sharply 
rejected such ‘harsh contrasts’ and ‘intolerable antagonisms’ between ‘spirit’ and 
‘nature’, citing in his support Carlyle’s caricature of natural theology as the belief that 
‘Nature’ was ‘dead, an old eight-day clock made many thousands of years ago and still 
ticking on, but as dead as brass, which the Maker at most sat looking at, in a distant, 
singular, and now plainly indeed, incredible manner’.27 Similarly, around the same time, 
                                                          
24 Jones, Browning, 50-51. 
25 Andrew Seth, Two Lectures on Theism (New York, 1897), 14-15. 
26 Wenley, ‘Some Lights on the British Idealistic Movement’, 451-3, 466-7. See also R. M. Wenley, ‘‘Tis 
Sixty Years Since’, University of California Publications in Philosophy, 6 (1929), 265-85, at 277-8. 
27 Henry Jones, Idealism as a Practical Creed: Being the Lectures on Philosophy and Modern Life 
Delivered Before the University of Sydney (Glasgow, 1909), 26-8. See also Henry Jones, ‘Modern 
Scientific and Philosophic Thought Regarding Human Society’, in J. B. Paton, P. W. Bunting and A. 
E. Garvie (eds.), Christ and Civilization: A Survey of the Influence of the Christian Religion upon the 
Course of Civilization (London, 1910), 491-521, at 509-10. 
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John MacCunn also invoked Carlyle’s ‘protest against the ‘Absentee God’ who sits on 
the outskirts of His universe to watch it go’.28  
 According to the British Idealists, Carlyle had also been correct in his claim that 
by removing God from the world, this false theology had inevitably given rise to the 
materialism and scepticism of David Hume and the French Encyclopaedists.29 As 
Edward Caird put it his essay ‘The Genius of Carlyle’ (1892), by conceiving ‘Nature’ as 
‘a piece of dead mechanism’, the deists of the eighteenth century had rendered ‘Religion’ 
a ‘hypocrisy’, and this had ‘therefore called forth an atheistic philosophy to destroy it’.30 
Similarly, in 1897, having cited Carlyle’s strictures against mechanistic theology, 
Andrew Seth claimed that the latter had contributed to ‘the drift of empirical philosophy 
towards a materialistic atheism’, such as that of Diderot and Holbach.31 Somewhat later, 
in 1927, J. H. Muirhead argued that natural theology’s ‘separation’ of ‘the ideal from 
the real’, ‘the finite from the infinite’, had been brought to its logical conclusion in 
‘Hume’s philosophy’. ‘Carlyle’, Muirhead added, ‘had felt all this – no one more 
vividly’.32 For his part, R. M. Wenley argued in 1929 that by excluding ‘providential 
interference from celestial mechanics’, ‘Newton’ and ‘Locke’ had effectively rendered 
‘the hypothesis of God superfluous’, and that it had fallen to ‘Hume to render the 
implicit contradiction explicit, by drawing unavoidable conclusions from the premises 
laid down by his predecessors’. ‘Carlyle’, Wenley noted, had been ‘compelled to 
                                                          
28 John MacCunn, Six Radical Thinkers: Bentham, J. S. Mill, Cobden, Carlyle, Mazzini, T. H. Green 
(London, 1910), 171. 
29 On British Idealism as a response to the so-called ‘Victorian crisis of faith’, see Mander, British 
Idealism, ch. 5. 
30 Caird, ‘The Genius of Carlyle’, 253-4. 
31 Seth, Two Lectures on Theism, 5-10. 
32 J. H. Muirhead, ‘How Hegel Came to England’, Mind, new series, 36 (1927), 423-47, at 435. 
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painful heart-searchings by the rationalism of Hume’, and had thus been driven to seek 
a new foundation for religious faith.33 
 As the British Idealists made clear, Carlyle had discovered such a foundation in 
German Idealism, and in particular its belief that God was not a transcendent artificer 
standing apart from the world, but rather a divine principle immanent in nature. This 
belief, they explained, had effectively subsumed materialism within what Carlyle had 
called a ‘Natural Supernaturalism’ (Sartor Resartus). For instance, in 1890 J. H. Stirling 
argued that Carlyle’s passages on ‘Natural Supernaturalism’ had been ‘the very first 
English words towards the restoration and rehabilitation of the dethroned upper powers’, 
an attempt to re-establish ‘in every earnest, educated, but doubting soul’ the ‘vital 
reality of true religion’.34 For Henry Jones, writing in 1891, Carlyle had thus overcome 
the dualisms of Deism, recognizing the rights of both ‘nature’ and ‘spirit’.35 The 
following year, in 1892, Edward Caird argued that the ‘main lesson’ of Carlyle’s Sartor 
Resartus had been that the ‘natural world is itself a symbol, vesture, or phenomenon of 
a spiritual or divine power’. Thus, in opposition to the Deism of the eighteenth century, 
the conclusion to be drawn was ‘not that spirit interferes with matter, or miraculously 
works upon it from without, but that the material or sensible world is itself, in its 
deepest essence, spiritual’. ‘No English writer in this century’, Caird added, ‘has done 
more to elevate and purify our ideals of life, and to make us conscious that the things of 
                                                          
33 Wenley, ‘‘Tis Sixty Years Since’, 272-4, 277-8. 
34 James Hutchison Stirling, Philosophy and Theology: Being the First Edinburgh University Gifford 
Lectures (Edinburgh, 1890), 80-81, 120-21. 
35 Jones, Browning, 49-51. See also Jones, Idealism as a Practical Creed, 27-8, and Jones, ‘Modern 
Scientific and Philosophic Thought’, 509-10. 
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the spirit are real, and that, in the last resort, there is no other reality’.36 As Caird 
explained the following year in 1893, the only way to meet the challenge of materialism 
would thus be  
 
to carry the war into the enemy’s quarters, and to maintain what Carlyle called a 
Natural Supernaturalism, i.e. the doctrine not that there are single miracles, but 
that the universe is miraculous; and that in order to conceive of it truly, we must 
think of it, not as a mechanical system occasionally broken in upon from above, 
but as an organism which implies a spiritual principle as its beginning and its 
end.37  
 
Caird’s pupil, John Watson, concurred in this judgment, writing in 1894 that like ‘the 
philosophy of Hegel’, Carlyle’s ‘natural supernaturalism’ had overcome ‘all theories 
which assume a transcendental world’, demonstrating that the ‘spiritual world’ was 
nothing but ‘the actual world contemplated from the inside, or as it truly is’.38 Similarly, 
in 1897 Andrew Seth argued that like Goethe, Lessing, Kant and Hegel, Carlyle had 
shown ‘that the divine is not to be sought as a problematical Spirit beyond the Stars’, 
but rather ‘in the face of nature’, and had thus overcome both ‘Deism’ and ‘Materialism’ 
                                                          
36 Caird, ‘The Genius of Carlyle’, 246, 250-51, 256-7, 267. 
37 Edward Caird, The Foundation of Religion: The Gifford Lectures Delivered Before the University of St 
Andrews in Sessions 1890-91 and 1891-92, 2 vols (Glasgow, 1893), i, 319-20. Caird’s words were 
cited with approval by his former pupil, R. M. Wenley, Contemporary Theology and Theism (New 
York, 1897), 29. 
38 John Watson, ‘The Problem of Hegel’, The Philosophical Review, 3 (1894), 546-67, at 547-8. See also 
John Watson, ‘The Idealism of Edward Caird. I.’, The Philosophical Review, 18 (1909), 147-63, at 
151-2. 
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within his doctrine of ‘Natural Supernaturalism’.39 In sum, as C. C. J. Webb explained 
in 1933, Carlyle had done more than any other nineteenth-century writer to undermine 
belief in the transcendence of God and the origin of the material world in an act of 
creation in time, and to put in its place an ‘essentially immanentist’ theology, drawn 
largely from the writings of the German Idealists.40  
 
History and Evolution 
 
 Having endorsed Carlyle’s theology of immanence, the British Idealists also 
embraced his providential view of human history. In particular, they followed Carlyle in 
arguing that history was ultimately progressive, being the self-realization of a divine 
idea of Justice, and that ‘Right’ eventually made for ‘Might’ (Past and Present). As 
Edward Caird explained in ‘The Genius of Carlyle’ (1892), Carlyle’s ‘natural 
supernaturalism’ implied a divine principle ‘in human history, a divine justice which is 
always executing itself upon men and nations’.41 J. S. Mackenzie argued in 1894 that 
Carlyle’s belief that ‘the soul of the world is just’ (Past and Present) had substantially 
the same meaning as Hegel’s famous dictum that ‘the Rational is Real’, that is, that the 
‘Ideal’ was realizing itself in human history.42 Somewhat later, in 1909, Andrew Seth 
                                                          
39 Seth, Two Lectures on Theism, 10-12, 14-15. See also A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the 
Light of Recent Philosophy (New York, 1917), 154-8 
40 Clement C. J. Webb, A Study of Religious Thought in England from 1850 (Oxford, 1933), 8-9, 14-15, 
33-6, quote at 66-7. 
41 Caird, ‘The Genius of Carlyle’, 250-51, see also 254-5. See also Caird, The Foundation of Religion, ii, 
7-12. 
42 J. S. Mackenzie, ‘Moral Sense and the Moral Life’, International Journal of Ethics, 4 (1894), 160-73, 
at 168-9. See also J. S. Mackenzie, ‘The Idea of Progress’, International Journal of Ethics, 9 (1899), 
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Pringle-Pattison endorsed Carlyle’s conception of ‘history as a process controlled, in 
spite of human wilfulness or stupidity, by ultimate Justice and Goodness’, while John 
Watson agreed with Carlyle’s ‘interpretation [of] history’, namely that ‘might is right’.43 
James Cappon, writing the same year, argued that Carlyle’s belief in ‘the unity of Might 
and Right’ and conception of ‘the Absolute as a vital process in history’ in fact came 
very close to ‘the Hegelian point of view’.44 In 1915 J. H. Muirhead argued that Carlyle 
and the German Idealists had concurred in their ‘conception of a moral purpose or Idea 
working in the ages’.45  
 Just as the British Idealists had embraced Carlyle’s ‘Natural Supernaturalism’ in 
response to the challenge of materialism, so they embraced his providential theory of 
history as a corrective to Darwinism.46 For instance, in 1893 David G. Ritchie argued 
that Darwin’s emphasis on evolution through ‘variation, heredity [and] struggle for 
Existence’ could be subsumed within Hegel’s dialectical conception of historical 
progress. ‘Whatever maintains itself’, Ritchie explained, ‘must do so because of some 
rationality that it has or had. When the rationality ceases, we have an appearance and 
not a reality, a sham that is doomed to perish. This, as we know, is the one lesson that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
195-213, at 196, J. S. Mackenzie, ‘Might and Right,’ in James Bryce et al. (eds.), The International 
Crisis: The Theory of the State (London, 1916), 56-91, at 69-70, and Mackenzie, ‘The Ethical Theory 
of Hegel’, 357. 
43 Seth Pringle-Pattison, ‘Introduction’, xi; Watson, ‘The Idealism of Edward Caird. I’, 151-2. 
44 Cappon, Edward Caird, 279. 
45 J. H. Muirhead, German Philosophy in Relation to the War (London, 1915), 22-3. 
46 Indeed, this is remarkable, given that Carlyle himself, during his later life, had been given to railing 
against Darwin as an atheist. For similar appropriations of Carlyle by scientists, predominantly in the 
1860s and 1870s, see Frank M. Turner, ‘Victorian Scientific Naturalism and Thomas Carlyle’, 
Victorian Studies, 18 (1975), 325-43. On the British Idealists’ response to Darwinism, see generally 
Mander, British Idealism, 261-7. 
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Carlyle read in history’.47 In 1894 Henry Jones argued that evolution could be 
understood as an ethical and moral process, whereby individualism progressively gave 
way to sociability. Jones wrote: 
 
With no less clearness and wholeness of conviction than Darwin has taught the 
evolution of the animal kingdom, Carlyle has declared that in the kingdom of 
man the only Might is Right… the power which is making for righteousness is 
in the world… [and we may] trust the cosmic process, and believe that within 
the wide range of its long history it has secured, and will secure in the future, not 
only the Survival of the Fittest, but also the Triumph of the Best. 
 
Furthermore, Jones added, the same great truth had been expressed in Hegel’s claim that 
‘The Real is Rational’, and ‘Whatever, is, is Right’.48 Several years later, in 1901, J. S. 
Mackenzie made the exact same claim, arguing that ‘the modern theory of evolution’ 
served to confirm both Carlyle’s belief that ‘Might makes Right’ and Hegel’s 
declaration that ‘Whatever is actual is rational’.49 In 1910 John MacCunn regretted that 
Carlyle had been unable to see the compatibility between his own ‘Natural 
Supernaturalism’ and Darwin’s theory of evolution.50 And, in 1931 J. H. Muirhead 
claimed that ‘a more philosophical appreciation of the roots of his own teaching’ would 
have led Carlyle ‘to see that, if his own doctrine of the Right as the fittest and the only 
                                                          
47 David G. Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel, with Other Philosophical Studies (London, 1893), 56, 63, 69-70. 
48 Henry Jones, Is the Order of Nature Opposed to the Moral Life? An Inaugural Lecture Delivered in the 
University of Glasgow on October 23rd, 1894 (Glasgow, 1894), 8-16, quotes on 11 and 16. See also 
Jones, Idealism as a Practical Creed, 22-4, 27-9, quotes on 27 and 29. 
49 J. S. Mackenzie, ‘The Hegelian Point of View’, Mind, 11 (1902), 54-71, at 67-8. 
50 MacCunn, Six Radical Thinkers, 165-6. 
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fit to survive was the gospel truth he held it to be, Darwinism, properly interpreted, so 
far from being inconsistent with what he had himself been teaching from the beginning, 
was only a further illustration of it.’51  
 
Moral and Ethical Philosophy 
 
 Having embraced Carlyle’s belief in the immanence of the divine in nature and 
history, the British Idealists also endorsed his doctrine of the immanence of the divine 
in man. In particular, they followed Carlyle in arguing that by the performance of 
‘Duty’, the individual not only joined himself to the divine law of the universe, but also 
actively participated in the realization of its purposes.52 For instance, in 1891 Henry 
Jones argued that like ‘Kant and Lessing, Fichte and Schiller, Goethe and Hegel’, 
Carlyle had perceived ‘the infinite in the finite’, and had ‘showed us, in a word, that the 
world is spiritual, that loyalty to Duty is the foundation of all human good’.53 In 1893 
Edward Caird cited Carlyle in illustration of his claim that instead of seeking 
satisfaction in the ‘finite’ objects, desires and pleasures of the sensual world, man ought 
rather to look ‘to the Being who unites the outward and the inward worlds and who 
manifests himself in both’.54 Similarly, in 1897 Andrew Seth claimed that the ‘Cosmos’ 
                                                          
51 Muirhead, ‘Carlyle’s Transcendental Symbolism’, 136-8, quote on 146. See also J. H. Muirhead, ‘The 
Inner Life in Relation to Morality: A Study in the Elements of Religion’, International Journal of 
Ethics, 1 (1891), 169-86, at 171-5, 185-6, and Webb, A Study of Religious Thought, 8-15, esp. 14-15. 
52 For an early recognition of this, see [J. H. Stirling], ‘Letters on Carlyle’, 148. 
53 Jones, Browning, 53-4, 67-8. 
54 Caird, The Foundation of Religion, i, 77-80. Caird also quoted Hegel to the same effect (i, 82-3). See 
also John Watson, An Outline of Philosophy with Notes Historical and Critical, 2nd ed. (Glasgow, 
1898), 201-2, John S. Mackenzie, Introduction to Social Philosophy (Glasgow, 1890), 121-3, John S. 
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had a moral and spiritual purpose, ‘an End-in-itself, as Kant called it, [that] we find only 
in the self-conscious life of man, in the world of Truth, Beauty and Goodness which he 
builds up for himself, and of which he constitutes himself a citizen’. Continuing, Seth 
noted how Carlyle had also expressed his ‘conviction of the infinite significance and 
value of the ethical life’, and his belief that ‘here only, in the life of ethical endeavour, is 
the end and secret of the universe to be found’.55 Writing in 1901, R. M. Wenley 
pointed out that Carlyle’s ‘cosmology’ flowed directly into his ‘anthropology’, in the 
sense that ‘human nature’, having ‘developed in the ‘natural supernatural’ course of 
events’, bore within it ‘its own characteristic ‘manifestation’ of the immanent divine 
principle’. As such, Wenley continued, man occupied ‘the unique position of being a 
direct co-worker with God’.56 For Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, writing in 1909, ‘for 
Carlyle, the acceptance of the law of Duty as the inmost law of things is belief in God, 
the only effective belief conceivable’, while for J. H. Muirhead, writing in 1912, Carlyle 
had followed Plato, Aristotle and Kant in teaching that ‘fidelity to Duty is not only the 
one condition of inward peace, but the preserving principle of human society and the 
way of access into the Divine purpose of creation’.57 Shortly thereafter, in 1914, R. B. 
Haldane delivered a lecture to the undergraduate students of the University of 
Edinburgh, in which he quoted from a ‘book, which in my time at the University was 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Mackenzie, A Manual of Ethics Designed for the Use of Students (London, 1892), 316, 312, 308, 302, 
J. S. Mackenzie, ‘The Infinite and the Perfect’, Mind, 13 (1904), 355-78, at 357-61, 365-6, 369-72, 
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56 Wenley, ‘Some Lights on the British Idealistic Movement’, 470. 
57 Seth Pringle-Pattison, ‘Introduction’, xi-xii; Muirhead, ‘Ethics’, 416. 
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much read, and which is, I think, still much read, Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus’. Here, 
Haldane explained, Carlyle had identified the source of spiritual ‘disease’ as ‘vanity and 
the claim for happiness’, teaching that ‘it is only with renunciation that the world can be 
said to begin’. ‘Looked at in the light that comes from the Eternal within our breasts’, 
Haldane continued, what mattered ‘was that we should be ready to accept with 
willingness the burden and the obligation which life had cast on us individually, and be 
able to see that in accepting it, hard as it might be to do so, we were choosing a 
blessedness which meant far more for us than what is commonly called happiness 
could’.58 A similar point was made in 1921 by Hugh Adam Reyburn, who argued that 
‘Carlyle, who did not know Hegel’s philosophy’, had nonetheless ‘gathered much of its 
import’, particularly  in his understanding that the ‘ideal’ was ‘the active principle of 
reality itself’, being ‘present in every phase of the moral world and embodied in every 
good action’.59 In other words, as J. H. Muirhead put it in 1928, Carlyle had seen that 
‘the ideal was no “far-off divine event” but something to be realized here-and-now’, 
particularly through the performance of ‘Duty’.60  
 As the British Idealists made clear, Carlyle’s belief in the immanence of the 
divine in man thus issued in a strongly ethical orientation, in which self-mastery, moral 
excellence, and the practical exercise of virtue took precedence over all else. As such, 
the British Idealists frequently highlighted Carlyle’s debts to ancient Greek moral 
                                                          
58 R. B. Haldane, The Conduct of Life: And Other Addresses (London, 1914), 4-9. 
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philosophy, particularly Cynicism and Stoicism.61 For instance, in 1894 James Seth 
explained how the Cynics had taught that 
 
Happiness… is to be sought within, not without; in virtue or excellence of 
character, not in pleasure… This is the constant text of Cynic morality – the 
supremacy of the human spirit over circumstance, its mastery of its own fortunes, 
founded on the sovereignty of reason over passion. The sum of Cynic wisdom is 
the sublime pride of the masterful rational self, which can acknowledge no other 
rule than its own, and which makes its possessor a king in a world of slaves. 
 
Such doctrines, Seth admitted, had at times ‘led the Cynics into strange extravagance 
and fanaticism’, particularly ‘contempt for their fellows, whom they regarded, like 
Carlyle, as “mostly fools”’.62 In 1902 J. S. Mackenzie argued that a strong emphasis on 
practical morality had been common to Socrates, the Stoics, Kant, Fichte and Carlyle, 
while, several years later, in 1917, Mackenzie referred to ‘the favourite doctrine of 
Carlyle, that all excellence is based on moral excellence’, commenting that this was 
akin to ‘the Stoical attribution of every kind of excellence to their wise man’.63 And, in 
                                                          
61 On Carlyle and Cynicism, see Alexander Jordan, ‘That Scotch Diogenes: Thomas Carlyle and 
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1924 R. M. Wenley explained how the ‘Stoics’ had ‘set pursuit of the ideal above 
pleasure, insisting that the freedom of the rational soul in thought, manifesting itself in 
effort to produce a type of character, ought to rule life’. This doctrine, Wenley argued, 
was not only discernible in the claim of Schiller, ‘a semi-Stoic’, that ‘to be a moral 
being is man’s destiny’, but also in the belief of Carlyle that ‘man is able to help himself, 
on his own resources, nay, to help deity’.64  
 However, many of the British Idealists were keen to emphasize that Carlyle’s 
doctrines regarding ‘Duty’ implied not only self-denial and self-sacrifice, but also a 
large measure of self-development and self-realization, that is, the duty to develop what 
was best in oneself, and to make the fullest possible use of one’s faculties for the benefit 
of one’s fellows. Once again, an ancient Greek reference was frequently invoked to 
elucidate this point, namely Aristotle. For example, during the 1890s, J. S. Mackenzie 
repeatedly drew attention to Carlyle’s distinction between ‘happiness’ and ‘blessedness’ 
(Sartor Resartus), arguing that while the former consisted in mere sensual pleasure and 
‘animal enjoyments’, the latter consisted in rational activity, ‘the realization of a higher 
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life’ and the ‘consciousness of doing right’.65 Similarly, in 1891 and 1908 J. Clark 
Murray claimed that Carlyle’s distinction between ‘happiness’ and ‘blessedness’ was 
substantially the same as Aristotle’s distinction between ‘Hedonism’ and ‘Eudemonism’, 
i.e. the difference between, on the one hand, mere selfish pleasure-seeking, and, on the 
other, the habitual striving to develop one’s ‘higher self’ through discipline and training. 
66 For his part, J. H. Muirhead argued in 1892 and 1900 that both Carlyle and Aristotle 
had protested ‘against the attempt to identify happiness with any mere state of passive 
satisfaction, e.g. pleasure’, instead locating it in ‘activity of the soul according to 
excellence’.67 And, in 1904 John MacCunn argued that unlike the Cynics, both Carlyle 
and Aristotle had understood that ‘the best gifts of the soul’ could be attained only ‘by 
acting in the world, not by withdrawing from it in an impotent fancied superiority’.68  
 More specifically, many of the British Idealists followed Carlyle in arguing that 
within a modern commercial society, the most appropriate arena for duty and self-
realization was the world of work.69 For example, in 1892 J. S. Mackenzie endorsed 
‘Carlyle’s commandment’, ‘Know what thou canst work at; and work at it, like a 
Hercules’ (Past and Present). By labouring, Mackenzie added, one demonstrated one’s 
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‘faith in human progress’, and thus one’s ‘love of God’.70 The same year, J. H. 
Muirhead agreed with Aristotle that virtue was the product of habit, commenting: 
 
The conduct of the hand and eye and intellect in daily work is as much moral 
conduct as the voluntary dealings with ourselves and others outside that work. 
An artisan or an artist or a writer who does not ‘do his best’ is not only an 
inferior workman, but a bad man. 
 
In a footnote, Muirhead then added: ‘Carlyle once said of a joiner who was doing a job 
in his house in Chelsea that he “broke the whole decalogue with every stroke of his 
hammer”’.71 In 1894 James Seth argued that ‘the only true ideal’ of human life was 
‘activity of the soul or self’. ‘Happiest’, Seth declared, ‘is he who can put his whole soul, 
all the energies of his spirit, into each day’s work.’ Such work, Seth claimed, would 
serve ‘as the means of spiritual expression and expansion’. Thus, Seth added, ‘we feel, 
for example, that Carlyle’s appreciation of his father’s masonry is essentially a true 
appreciation’.72 Subsequently, in 1911 J. B. Baillie rejected the ‘Hebrew’ conception of 
labour, namely as ‘a necessary evil, a kind of punishment’, arguing that labour often 
served as an ‘expression and development of the individual life which it brings about’. 
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As such, Baillie claimed, ‘a man’s labour is his moral life, in one of the forms in which 
his moral life is lived’. Continuing, Baillie wrote: 
 
Carlyle once said of a bad workman engaged on a job in Carlyle’s house, that he 
broke the whole decalogue with every stroke of his hammer. And the remark 
goes to the root of the meaning of labour, so far as the labourer is concerned. We 
cannot separate the way a man does the task from the task which he does. The 
result will inevitably vary with what the man is and the way he does it.73 
 
Similarly, around the same time, Henry Jones argued that ‘labour is meant to dignify the 
labourer’, making him ‘a better man’. ‘The energies which he sets free upon his 
handicraft’, Jones continued, ‘are capable, as every honest workman knows, of coming 
back to him enriched; bringing with them more skill, the consciousness of a duty well 
done’. In support of his claim, Jones then cited at length from Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, 
to the effect that only those who worked, whether by hand or by head, were worthy of 
honour.74 And, in 1928 J. H. Muirhead told his audience: 
 
There is no deeper saying in human language than the old ‘laborare est orare.’ 
On this Carlyle once truly commented: ‘I find that a man cannot make a pair of 
shoes rightly unless he does it in a devout manner… All work properly so called 
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is an appeal from the Seen to the Unseen – a devout calling on the Higher 
Powers’ (Past and Present).75 
  
 Unsurprisingly, this lofty ethical philosophy implied an extreme hostility 
towards the sceptical Epicureanism that had been propounded by David Hume and 
Jeremy Bentham, as well as towards the more sophisticated utilitarianism of John Stuart 
Mill. Following Carlyle, the British Idealists argued that in reducing human motivation 
to self-interested considerations of pleasure and pain, the utilitarian not only degraded 
human beings to the level of animals, but also undermined any concept of moral 
obligation.76 As J. H. Muirhead explained in 1892, such mistaken ideas had a long 
historical pedigree, dating back to the Cyrenaics and Epicureans. However, whereas the 
ancient Epicureans had been unabashedly individualistic, their modern counterparts had 
been preoccupied with how to extract morality and sociability from self-interest. To do 
so, they had relied primarily on prudential calculations regarding the long-term balance 
of pleasures and pains, and on external ‘sanctions’ such as the pressure of ‘public 
opinion’. However, Muirhead argued, ‘conduct which issues from regard for these 
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sanctions is not morality’, a point that Carlyle had made in Sartor Resartus.77 In 1902 
Henry Laurie wrote in reference to Hume’s ethical philosophy: 
 
The mere facts of pleasure and desire do not contain within them the imperative 
command of duty… Hume [does not] explain how the end of personal happiness, 
or the fitness of means to that end, can generate the idea of moral obligation. 
The consciousness of integrity is doubtless requisite, as he remarks, to the 
happiness of the honest man; but while the happiness springs from the 
consciousness, the obligation cannot be conjured from the happiness. And if all 
that honesty can plead for itself is that it is the best policy, then, as Carlyle has 
said, the world had better count its spoons to begin with, and look out for 
hurricanes and earthquakes to end with.78 
  
In 1891 J. S, Mackenzie wrote that Carlyle had been fundamentally correct in 
condemning the works of Jeremy Bentham as a ‘pig philosophy’ (Latter-Day 
Pamphlets), a crude hedonism and individualism that was capable only of negation and 
destruction.79 According to John MacCunn, writing in 1910, John Stuart Mill had seen, 
as ‘Carlyle saw with still clearer eyes’, that the ‘hedonism’ of Bentham ‘was impotent 
to justify and still more to evoke sacrifice’.80 However, according to several other 
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British Idealists, Mill’s attempt to introduce an emphasis on disinterested sociability 
into utilitarianism had ultimately failed, and Carlyle’s objections still stood. For 
example, in an early essay (c. 1867-9), F. H. Bradley claimed that Mill’s injunction to 
seek the happiness of others contradicted the utilitarian premises of his philosophy, 
since for the utilitarian, the happiness of others ultimately had no value except as a 
means to one’s own. Moreover, Bradley continued, Mill’s attempt to introduce a 
distinction between the ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures was entirely arbitrary, since there 
was no guarantee that people would prefer the former to the latter. According to Bradley, 
pleasure was not only subjective, varying from individual to individual, but also 
frequently brought individuals into conflict with each other. As such, it could not 
provide an objective, a priori, universal ‘moral law’ or ‘categorical Imperative’. To 
clinch his point, Bradley then cited from Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, viz., ‘Love not 
Pleasure; love God’.81 Writing in 1911, W. R. Sorley argued that Mill’s call to seek the 
happiness of others was ‘apt to lose hold of the will’, since it lacked any concept of 
properly ‘Religious Virtue’, that is, a faith in divine providence. Carlyle, Sorley added, 
was one of those who had clearly understood this point.82  
However, in some cases, the British Idealists’ emphasis on duty, practical 
morality and self-realization also implied considerable hostility towards certain aspects 
of Christian theology, notably the preoccupation with individual salvation, and the 
reliance on other-worldly rewards and punishments. Indeed, following Carlyle, several 
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of the British Idealists argued that this kind of Christian Epicureanism merely 
multiplied selfishness and sensuality into all eternity.83 For instance, in 1882 A. C. 
Bradley argued that ‘the essence of religion is not at all the wish to be happy’, but rather 
‘the entire devotion of personal will’ to ‘ideal truth, beauty and goodness’. Indeed, as 
‘Carlyle’, ‘a great seer’, had pointed out, ‘the only happiness a brave man ever troubled 
himself with asking much about was, happiness enough to get his work done’ (Past and 
Present).84 In 1892 J. H. Muirhead pointed out that unlike ancient Epicureanism, 
modern Epicureanism had often relied on religious sanctions, that is, heaven and hell, to 
promote moral conduct. However, Muirhead claimed, ‘conduct which issues from 
regard for these sanctions is not morality’. Far preferable, Muirhead added, was the 
ideal of ‘Blessedness’ set out by Carlyle in Sartor Resartus.85 The same year, J. S. 
Mackenzie, in a lecture to the members of the London Ethical Society, stated that ‘we 
have grown dissatisfied with Christianity’, since ‘Christianity was an individualistic 
religion’. Rather than seeking ‘the salvation of the soul’ in the next world, Mackenzie 
argued, one ought instead to seek ‘the salvation of society’ within ‘the life of the State’. 
In order to ‘enlarge the sense of public duty’, and to promote ‘the development of 
human society, the working out of that which is highest and best’, Mackenzie concluded, 
a ‘new religion’ would be required, the rudiments of which could already be ‘found in 
the writings of Carlyle’.86 Perhaps most strikingly, in 1912 William Jethro Brown 
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argued that Benthamism and Evangelicalism were both forms of individualism, a 
philosophy that was increasingly obsolete. ‘The thought of our day’, Brown claimed, ‘is 
intolerant of the individual whose supreme concern is the salvation of his own soul’. 
Indeed, Brown added, Carlyle had ‘expressed this intolerance with characteristic vigour’, 
particularly in his polemic against ‘Methodism’ as a ‘new phasis of Egoism, stretched 
out into the Infinite’ (Past and Present). However, Brown claimed, individualism was 
already being supplanted by Idealism, which directed men not towards a transcendent 
heaven, but rather towards the ethical life of the State.87 
 
Social and political thought 
 
 As early as 1846, one contemporary noted that thanks to ‘the erratic and 
versatile genius of Carlyle’, ‘idealistic principles of legislation’ were fast ‘gaining 
ground’.88 Indeed, by 1892, Edward Caird could declare that Carlyle had been ‘the 
source of so many of the most important social and political movements of the present 
day’, having ‘set before us as our aim, not any single measure of reform, but a new idea 
of political and social life’.89  
 In particular, the British Idealists attached great importance to Carlyle’s polemic 
against Epicurean thinkers such as David Hume and Jeremy Bentham, who had denied 
any natural propensity for sociability, and had attempted instead to found social and 
political life on enlightened self-interest. This had involved a fundamentally negative 
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concept of liberty, in which the state largely left individuals free to pursue their own 
interests, applying limited checks and balances only when necessary.90 For instance, in 
1891 Henry Jones credited Carlyle with having refuted Hume’s belief that man was ‘a 
being animated solely by the sensuous springs of pleasure and pain’, and that ‘society 
was a gathering of mere individuals, repelling each other by their needs and greed, with 
a ring of natural necessity to bind them together’.91 Similarly, in 1907 Andrew Seth 
Pringle-Pattison also praised Carlyle’s polemic against the ‘sensationalism’ and 
‘individualism’ of Hume, which had treated ‘society as an aggregate of mutually 
exclusive units, each pursuing as sole end his own individual pleasure’. As Carlyle had 
shown, such attempts to evolve ‘social and benevolent action from the play of 
individual selfishness’ were doomed to failure.92 Writing in 1909, John Watson agreed 
with Carlyle that the utilitarian theories of Bentham and his followers amounted to little 
more than ‘Anarchy plus the street-constable’, having ‘overlooked the fundamental 
nature of the State, as not an arbitrary association of independent units, but an 
expression of the social nature of man’.93  
 In the economic sphere, the British Idealists followed Carlyle in denouncing the 
doctrine of laissez-faire, which, they claimed, tended to reduce national life to the 
selfish pursuit of material wealth, to degrade all human relations into a mere ‘cash-
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nexus’, and, in short, to deteriorate into anarchy. Moreover, they also followed Carlyle 
in arguing that the worst symptom of such anarchy was the suffering of the working 
classes. For instance, in his lecture ‘Carlyle and St. Simon’ (1888), Edward Caird noted 
that Carlyle had considered his era to be ‘a period of division and even of anarchy’, in 
which ‘cash payment is the sole nexus of man to man’. Even if ‘men are now less 
directly under the control, and exposed to the injustice, of other individuals’, Caird 
argued, ‘they seem more liable to incalculable disaster from the vast machine of trade, 
which by sudden changes disturbs and unsettles the course of their lives, and makes 
their labour and skill suddenly worthless’.94 And, in a subsequent text, Caird endorsed 
Carlyle’s judgement that ‘Laissez faire’ was ultimately ‘negative rather than positive, a 
disintegrating rather than a uniting force’.95 J. S. Mackenzie made substantially the 
same point in 1890, writing: 
 
The evils of the ‘cash nexus’ were exhibited by Carlyle, with his usual 
emphasis… The slavery is no longer that of one person another, but rather that 
of persons to things. This is a kind of slavery, however; for if a person is under 
the control of a thing, i.e. a mere mechanical necessity, he is himself reduced to 
the condition of a thing even more thoroughly than if he were under the absolute 
control of another person.96 
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Two years later, in 1892, Mackenzie invoked Carlyle in support of a strongly republican 
diatribe against ‘Social Corruption’, citing ‘Carlyle’s opinion’ that current social 
arrangements seemed expressly ‘calculated’ for the ‘strangling’ of ‘heroic virtue’ 
(Carlyle, The Opera). ‘Among the rich’, Mackenzie continued, ‘luxury is encouraged’, 
and ‘men are tempted to seek the satisfaction of [such false wants] by dishonourable 
means’. At the same time, ‘the poor’ were ‘exploited – i.e. used as a mere means for the 
advantages of others’. ‘When a nation has reached such a stage as this’, Mackenzie 
concluded, ‘it often declines and falls’, ‘unless it is reawakened by a reformer, such as 
in our own time Carlyle’.97 In 1894 John MacCunn cited Carlyle’s judgement that 
Britain could no longer be called a ‘Society’, being more like ‘a common and 
overcrowded Lodging-house, where each, isolated, regardless of his neighbour, turned 
against his neighbour, clutches what he can get’ (Sartor Resartus). Despite a degree of 
exaggeration, MacCunn commented, Carlyle’s words effectively captured ‘the 
disintegrating spirit of individual competition, which is Fraternity’s very negation’.98 In 
1907 Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison praised Carlyle for having denounced the followers 
of Bentham, the so-called ‘Philosophic Radicals’, for their dogmatic commitment to the 
‘abstract and negative’ doctrine of ‘Laissez-faire’, and their indifference to the 
sufferings of the poor.99 And, in 1928 J. H. Muirhead expressed severe disquiet 
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regarding his contemporaries’ obsession with the pursuit of material wealth, and with 
the improvement of the ‘machinery’ that served as a means to it. The effect, Muirhead 
claimed, was to make ‘mind itself a [mere] means or an instrument for manipulating 
[natural] forces for individual or corporate advantage, in the last instance for the 
increase of enjoyment, as the average man counts enjoyment’. ‘Carlyle’ he added, ‘just 
about a century ago called attention to all this in his epoch-making essay on the Signs of 
the Times’, and ‘what he there says has been verified to the letter and on a scale that 
even he failed to predict’.100   
 According to the British Idealists, Carlyle had also been correct in identifying a 
tendency to extend the principles of laissez faire into politics, particularly through a 
theory of democracy founded on the representation of ‘interests’ and ‘public opinion’. 
Such a theory, they argued, tended to dispense with any need for virtue, patriotism, or 
wisdom amongst electors.101 Moreover, it also tended to result in a tyranny of the 
majority, in which the wise and the virtuous were shouted down by the mob. For 
instance, in 1894 John MacCunn argued that Carlyle had been right to oppose ‘the 
transference of this individualistic principle… from commerce and industry into the 
larger domain of politics’, and more specifically ‘the memorable attempt of Bentham 
and the Benthamites to found Democracy firmly and forever on a theory of self-
interest’.102 In 1899 Bernard Bosanquet rejected any attempt to determine ‘the good of 
the State’ through ‘the study of mere public opinion’, or the ‘particular judgements’ of 
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‘individuals’. The latter, he argued, were frequently ‘full of falsehood and vanity’, being, 
as Carlyle had pointed out, ‘mostly fools’.103 In 1905 R. M. Wenley identified Carlyle’s 
opposition to such theories of democracy with Plato’s opposition to the Sophists, an 
analogy that was repeated by several other British Idealists.104 Most notably, in 1906 J. 
S. Mackenzie remarked that Plato, Aristotle, and Carlyle had all opposed Democracy on 
the grounds that it promoted licentiousness and mindless hedonism, while also granting 
equality to those who were not equal. In particular, Mackenzie argued that Carlyle had 
been right to oppose the extension of laissez faire into politics, writing: 
 
Democracy is too often conceived as meaning simply a state in which one has an 
eye to his own interest; and it is sometimes supposed that in this way the 
interests of all will be served… [However, the] mere struggle of competing 
interests cannot reasonably be expected to lead to the good of the whole. In 
economics this is now, I believe, pretty generally recognized; pure laisser faire 
is a discredited principle. But is it any more reliable in general politics? … we 
must recognize that this is a real danger confronting our modern democratic 
states; and it is one of the dangers that was much in the minds of Carlyle and 
Ruskin, as well as in that of Aristotle. 
 
Furthermore, Mackenzie argued, Carlyle had been ‘to a large extent right’ in opposing 
‘an exaggerated deference to majorities’. Indeed, such a ‘merely mechanical’ approach 
could not be trusted to reveal ‘the true general will’, since the majority were frequently 
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misled and manipulated by demagogues. Moreover, it also tended to result in ‘a 
constant silencing’ of the wise and virtuous minority, it being ‘perhaps this, more than 
anything else, that Carlyle has in view in his denunciations of Democracy’.105  
 In opposition to such Epicurean or utilitarian theories, the British Idealists 
followed Carlyle in propounding a strongly ethical concept of the State, in which the 
latter was conceived as an educational and civilizing institution, serving to promote 
good moral character, self-realization and human flourishing (in other words, ‘positive 
liberty’).106 Frequently, Carlyle was thus associated with Plato, particularly in his 
emphasis on political conformity with the divine law of Justice that animated the 
universe.107 As early as 1865, Edward Caird pointed out that ‘in the Republic, Plato, like 
half the great moral teachers, down even to our own Carlyle, turns the question, “What 
is my right?” into the other question, “What is my duty?”… and maintains… that duties, 
not rights, are to be considered in the foundation of the state’.108 Three decades later, in 
1892, Caird reiterated this judgement, referring to ‘how much [Carlyle] did to banish 
the eighteenth-century theory of the limitations of the government to the functions of a 
grand policeman, and to revive the old Platonic idea that the State had a social and 
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ethical work to perform’.109 In 1895 Bernard Bosanquet wrote of how both Plato and 
Carlyle had believed that the ‘laws of the state’ ought to ‘copy or embody the actual 
principles of justice which are involved in human nature and society and the course of 
the world’.110 And, shortly thereafter, in 1897, R. L. Nettleship noted that like Carlyle, 
Plato had ridiculed ‘the legislative reformers of his own time’, who had placed their 
faith in constitutional mechanisms, maintaining instead that that ‘the great problem for 
the statesman is to keep up a certain character among the citizens’.111 Thus, as John 
MacCunn pointed out in 1910, both Plato and Carlyle had seen ‘politics’ and ‘ethics’ as 
one and the same.112 According to A. C. Bradley, writing in 1880, Carlyle’s concept of 
the State also resembled that of Aristotle, particularly in having as its end the fullest 
possible development of human nature, and the spiritual freedom of its citizens. As such, 
the State was not a ‘community in mere living’, serving to facilitating the production of 
material wealth, but rather a ‘community in good living’, existing to make its ‘citizens 
good and just men’.113 In a somewhat more modern reference, several of the British 
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Idealists implied that in seeking to revive an ethical, idealistic concept of the State, 
Carlyle had been engaged in fundamentally the same endeavour as Hegel.114  
 In the economic sphere, the British Idealists followed Carlyle in demanding 
substantial measures of state intervention and regulation. These, they argued, would 
solve the so-called ‘social problem’ by bringing the working classes within the ethical 
life of the State, and would also realise the potential of labour to become a means of 
moral and spiritual fulfilment. However, the British Idealists often qualified their 
support for Carlyle’s proposals, stressing that any such reforms ought to help the 
working classes to help themselves, enhancing rather than stifling independence and 
autonomy. Moreover, they also stressed that in the last analysis, the success of such 
reforms would rely upon the active participation and patriotism of the working classes 
themselves. For instance, in his article ‘Carlyle and St. Simon’ (1888), Edward Caird 
explained how Saint-Simon, ‘one of the first of modern Socialists’, had demanded ‘a 
new feudalism of industry’, an idea that had subsequently been taken up and 
popularized in Britain by Carlyle. However, Caird continued, ‘we [must] modify in 
many ways the broad generalization which Carlyle makes. We [must] treat the advance 
of individual liberty, as well as the perfecting of organization, as an essential element in 
progress’. Thus, it was important to remember that ‘there can be no real help given to 
any one which breaks down, or does not draw forth his individual energy and 
independence’.115 Nonetheless, despite such qualifications, Caird subsequently lauded 
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Carlyle for having inspired ‘a continually increasing effort of Parliament to deal with 
social questions’, including through factory acts and regulations regarding workplace 
safety.116 Similarly, in a series of works written during the 1890s, J. S. Mackenzie 
hailed the passing of the era of ‘laissez faire’, and the recognition that ‘the amassing of 
material wealth cannot… be accepted as the ultimate… end for human beings’. Now, he 
continued, the task at hand was ‘what Carlyle used to describe as the “Everlasting Yea” 
– the work of reorganisation’.117 However, Mackenzie regretted Carlyle’s frequent use 
of feudal analogies, and his advocacy of economic paternalism and life-long contracts. 
‘A paternal relationship’, Mackenzie claimed, ‘easily passes into tyranny’, while the 
‘hiring of a man’s services for life – which Carlyle regarded as the ideal method – 
inevitably means, even under the most favourable conditions, that the person who is 
hired sinks into little more than a mere means’. Concluding, Mackenzie put forward a 
compromise position, writing: 
 
the remedy… I think, is not to abolish the cash nexus, but to establish higher and 
better nexuses along with it. We must recognize – even Carlyle in his soberer 
moments recognized – that the nexus of absolute masterdom and slavery is no 
longer possible, and that other small nexuses have gone along with it. The 
nexuses of modern times must be of a larger nature, – co-operative societies, 
religious associations, unions and combinations for mutual help. Such 
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associations… must endeavour to secure that the parties to the contract shall be 
treated as men, – i.e. as ends in themselves, – and not merely as instruments.118 
 
In 1909 Henry Jones quoted from Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, to the effect that only those 
who laboured were entitled to respect and honour. However, he noted, there were 
currently many ‘stations in life and rounds of daily duty whose spiritual value for those 
who are engaged in them is very low’. As such, Jones argued, the State ought simply to 
‘prohibit much of the labour which dehumanizes men’.119 Similarly, in 1911 J. B. 
Baillie cited Carlyle on the moral and spiritual character of labour, adding that ‘to toil is 
thus to share in and to promote the good of the social whole’, that is, the ‘common 
good’. As such, the work of the labourer ‘gives him a claim on society, e.g. in his right 
to have a reward or wage for his labour; it procures him the means of subsistence, 
compels society to take care of his health and training’. However, Baillie added, while 
the labourer was thus right ‘to compel others to recognize the ethical importance of 
himself and his work for society’, he ought also ‘to recognize for himself the individual 
responsibilities under which he is placed in performing his task’.120 In 1912 William 
Jethro Brown cited Carlyle on the evils of ‘Unemployment’, arguing that the sheer 
extent of the latter now ‘impose[d] upon the State new responsibilities which can no 
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longer be ignored’. In addition to finding work for the unemployed, Brown argued, the 
State ought also to fix a living wage, as was already being done by the Wages Boards 
recently established in Australia.121 In 1918 J. H. Muirhead and Hector Hetherington 
quoted from Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus regarding the dignity and nobility of labour, 
before adducing a point 
 
of prime ethical significance – that by his industry a man acquires a standing in 
the world…  He has the right to stand four-square before the world, requiring 
from others, in virtue of his service to them, the things which he does not make 
for himself… From this point of view there is a genuine ethical significance in a 
claim of which we used to be constantly reminded – the claim for the Right to 
Work… It is, in effect, a moral demand; that the individual should have not only 
the means of life, but the conditions of personal integrity. 
 
In addition to recognising the Right to Work, Muirhead and Hetherington added, the 
State would also have to address the fact that much actual work was monotonous, 
stultifying, and even brutalizing, serving to crush rather than to develop intellectual and 
moral character. Possible solutions, they suggested, might include industrial co-
partnership (whereby an employer granted his workers a share in the management and 
profits of the company), and even the deliberate breaking up of largescale industry, in 
order to return to a quasi-medieval system of artisanal craftmanship and guilds. As a 
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result, Muirhead and Hetherington hoped, industry would become both an ethical 
institution and ‘a function of citizenship’. However, they added, this would require ‘a 
very high degree of industrial patriotism’ on the part of workers themselves.122 
 Given their strong emphasis on the ethical role of the State and the need to 
promote the moral and spiritual improvement of the working classes, the British 
Idealists frequently praised Carlyle for having been one of the earliest advocates of a 
system of free, universal, public education.123 For instance, in a sermon delivered in 
1901 Edward Caird made an explicit point to this effect.124 In 1908 J. H. Muirhead 
argued that Carlyle had thus voiced ‘the democratic claim for equality in the only form 
in which it represents a claim to justice’, that is, ‘the opportunity not merely to have and 
to be happy, but to do and to realise’.125 Moreover, on one striking occasion, the British 
Idealists’ endorsement of Carlyle’s proposals for national education interlocked with 
their support for his ideas regarding the moral, civic and spiritual potential of labour. In 
1917 J. S. Mackenzie told a meeting of the Civic and Moral Educational League that 
‘good citizenship’ was ‘the fundamental object that education should seek to promote’. 
However, in modern Britain, the individual also needed to ‘be prepared for the 
performance of some specific work’. Thus, Mackenzie continued, training for work 
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125 Muirhead, The Service of the State, 81-4. See also Muirhead, ‘Carlyle’s Transcendental Symbolism’, 
143-4. 
43 
 
may rightly be said to be an essential point of moral education, one might almost 
say even of religious education. Carlyle’s favourite dictum, Laborare est orare, 
has at least an element of truth. It is true, however, only when the work is 
undertaken, as all work ought to be, in the spirit of social service… [The 
worker] has to interest himself also in the maintenance and advancement of the 
general life of his community and even of the world. It is the chief business of 
all of us – and here at least we have Carlyle with us – to try to make our world, 
or some small spot in it, less chaotic and more human. 
 
In addition to ordinary schools, Mackenzie claimed, such ideals could also be realized 
through institutions such as the Workers’ Educational Association.126 
 As part of their ethical, educational and civilizational ideal of the State, the 
British Idealists called for a reassertion of the importance of authority. Having accepted 
Carlyle’s criticisms of the cruder forms of democracy (i.e. as simple majority rule), the 
British Idealists also demonstrated considerable sympathy with his emphasis on heroic 
leadership. However, they were keen to stress that this ought not to be seen as an 
alternative to democracy, but rather as a development and completion of democracy 
from within, and that all authority ought ultimately to rest on the free assent of an 
educated citizenry. For instance, in 1889 Bernard Bosanquet referred to the role of 
Pericles in ancient Athens, citing Hegel’s judgement that ‘of all that is great for 
humanity, the greatest thing is to dominate the wills of men who have wills of their 
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own’. This, Bosanquet commented, was ‘what Carlyle invariably forgot’.127 In 1892 
Edward Caird made the same point, writing that while ‘everyone must admit that 
Carlyle is right in saying that the success of [democracy], as of every system, must 
depend greatly on the ability of men to recognise and to reverence those who are their 
true guides and superiors’, ‘this need by no means imply anything like an absolute 
submission, either of opinion or will.’128 The same year, Henry Nettleship claimed that 
Carlyle had rightly sensed where ‘the weak side of contemporary liberalism lay’, and 
had ‘made a real attempt to set up a positive authority in the shape of the great men of 
history’, even if he had admittedly ‘executed his task in too crude and hasty a manner’. 
Nonetheless, Nettleship argued, Carlyle had undoubtedly been in ‘the right path’, and 
the time had come for liberalism to ‘take up more positive ground’, recognising the 
importance of great and leading men such as Frederick the Great and Garibaldi, who 
had actively worked upon and shaped public opinion, showing ‘the masses’ what they 
truly willed.129 In 1910 Henry Jones called for a reconciliation between Carlylean 
heroism and democracy, writing: 
 
We shall not, like Plato, prefer the despotism of the philosopher-king to 
democracy, nor, like Carlyle, endow the ordinary citizen with only the right to 
obey. We shall recognize that the philosopher-king in order to govern requires 
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philosophic subjects, and that the citizen who can willingly obey the wise must 
himself be wise.130 
 
For his part, J. S. Mackenzie admitted that if society were ‘constructed on such a model 
as Carlyle suggested, with the philosopher-king at the top’, there would be a strong risk 
that the aristocracy of talent would become corrupt. Moreover, Mackenzie claimed, 
‘such a society as is here supposed would not in reality be an ideal one, because it 
would not be for the majority of citizens an educative one’. Thus, the aim ought not to 
be to ‘make the philosopher a king, but rather to make philosophy king – i.e. to make 
wisdom the ruling influence in the state – and to bring this about, it would be necessary 
that all the citizens should be trained to think’.131 However, in his subsequent works, 
Mackenzie stressed that the ‘aristocracy of talent’ envisaged by ‘Plato, Aristotle, 
Carlyle and Ruskin’ was not necessarily incompatible with modern representative 
democracy. He explained: 
 
A real Democracy, in short, must be aristocratic – it must aim at government by 
the best; and there can be no practical realization of aristocracy except through 
the cultivation of the Democratic spirit – the spirit that is ready to recognize that 
to be governed by its best is to be governed by itself.  
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Such a polity, Mackenzie concluded, would represent the realisation of that ‘well-
ordered state, at once truly democratic and truly aristocratic, of which Plato and Carlyle 
could only vaguely dream’.132 More concretely, in 1911 Mackenzie proposed replacing 
the House of Lords with a ‘national Senate’, ‘an assembly of men (and, I should hope, 
of women too), of trained capacity and long service in the affairs of state’, designed to 
‘advise and guide’ the deliberations of the House of Commons. This would, Mackenzie 
claimed 
 
bring us nearer to what Plato meant by his conception of the philosopher-king, 
and to what Carlyle meant by the rule of Heroes. I doubt whether we ought to be 
ruled either by a philosopher or by a hero; but it would probably be well for us if 
we could be guided by the one and led by the other.133 
 
Thus, as Mackenzie reiterated in 1926, the ‘Divine Right of the Hero’ ought ‘to give 
place to the more modest claim of the born leader to be allowed to lead’. After all, as 
‘Carlyle himself recognized’, ‘the typical Hero is one who has absorbed the best 
wisdom of his time and understands what, at least in one sense, may be called the Real 
Will of his people’.134  
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Finally, Carlyle also had an impact on at least one British Idealist’s vision of the 
British Empire.135 In 1900 J. H. Muirhead wrote of how during the early-nineteenth 
century, the Benthamites and the various adherents of ‘Manchesterism’ had seen 
colonies as mere commercial assets, to be discarded when no longer remunerative. 
However, Muirhead wrote, by the mid-1840s, a new ‘Spirit of the Century’ had begun 
to take shape. ‘If’, he continued, ‘there is any single name more than another that 
represents the ideas for which our new imperialism stands, it is Carlyle’s’. In particular, 
Muirhead explained, Carlyle had shown that the value of the colonies was not to be 
estimated in purely commercial terms. To the contrary, they were an extension of 
Britain itself, the dwelling place of the ‘children of Britain’, and destined to themselves 
become ‘the cradle of mighty Nations, and their Sciences and Heroisms’. So far as 
indigenous peoples were concerned, Muirhead argued, the British State was charged 
with a grand civilizational and ethical enterprise, namely ‘the reconstruction of the 
moral, industrial and political ideas of some four or five hundred millions of souls’. 
Indeed, there was no reason to hesitate regarding ‘the spread of European ideas of truth 
and justice’, Muirhead argued, since ‘Justice is justice’, ‘all the world over’. However, 
he added, it would be preferable to set about this task in a ‘spirit of Conciliation’, 
seeking to secure ‘the acquiescence, if not the co-operation, of other nations’.136 
 
 Conclusion 
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 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the British Idealists had established 
themselves as the predominant school of British philosophy. In turn, they looked back 
upon Carlyle as the predominant British thinker of the nineteenth century, considering 
themselves his heirs in almost every sense imaginable. Via Carlyle, the opposition of 
earlier Scottish thinkers such as Reid and Hamilton to the scepticism, materialism and 
sensationalism of Hume was thus transmitted well into the twentieth century. As this 
article has demonstrated, the British Idealists frequently interpreted Carlyle’s 
significance in terms of a series of transitions. With regard to theology, the British 
Idealists praised Carlyle for having resolved the eighteenth-century dualism of Deism 
and materialism within his own doctrine of ‘Natural Supernaturalism’, that is, the belief 
that the divine was immanent in nature, matter and history. This, they argued, provided 
a means to reconcile the advances of modern science, and particularly Darwinism, with 
a renewed faith in divine providence. With regard to morals and ethics, the British 
Idealists attached particular value to Carlyle’s polemic against the Epicureanism of the 
eighteenth century, including both the sceptical Epicureanism of Hume and Bentham 
and the Christian Epicureanism of Paley. In opposition to these thinkers, the British 
Idealists pointed out, Carlyle had vindicated the natural sociability of man, preaching 
the divine force immanent within humanity, requiring to be realized through ‘Duty’. In 
this sense, the British Idealists believed, Carlyle had borne a strong resemblance to the 
ancient Stoics. Finally, with regard to politics, the British Idealists eulogised Carlyle for 
having refuted the eighteenth-century, Epicurean claim that the state was but a means to 
the pursuit of self-interest and material wealth. To the contrary, they made clear, Carlyle 
had successfully re-asserted the educational, ethical and indeed spiritual significance of 
the State, as an agency of the divine principle of Justice that animated the universe. In 
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this regard, the British Idealists claimed, Carlyle had resembled both Plato and Aristotle. 
Indeed, it is arguable that Carlyle’s true political legacy ought to be understood in these 
terms, before his reputation was swallowed up by accusations of ‘fascism’ beginning in 
the 1930s. Furthermore, the British Idealists also praised Carlyle for having discredited 
the utilitarian anti-imperialism of Bentham, and for having vindicated the progressive, 
civilizational role of the British Empire. In this sense, the British Idealists followed 
Carlyle in believing that the ethical mission of the British State was not confined only to 
Britain, but rather extended to the furthest frontiers of the earth.   
